Intervention in defiance of unlawful arrest : the Police v Bluegum by Newman, Felicity Jane.


F'ELICITY NEW1'1AN 
INTERVENTION IN DEFIANCE OF' UNLAWFUL ARREST 
THE POLICE V BLUEGUM 
------
SUBMITTED FOR THE LL. B. (HONOURS) 
DEGREE AT THE VICTORIA UNIVERSITY 
OF' WELLINGTON 
1 SEPTEMBER 1 981 

< 
". C O N T E H T S 
Table of Cases 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. THE BLUEGUM CASE 
A. The Facts 
B. The Judqement 
I -""" 
for Williams 
c. The Judqement Acrainst Bluequm --
III. CRIT'ICI SM OF THE CONSIDERA'I'I ON OF 
COMMON LAW AUTHORITIES 
iii 
1 
2 
2 
4 
8 
1 3 
A. Ca.se~~Ci te.d in t:.he_,.Bluegum J~q2.<;>men!_ 1 3 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
1 ~ Fennell -
2. Du.f_fy 
3. Rua 
B. Cases and Authorities Not Referred 
to i n Bluegum 
COJv'lP ARATIVE LAW 
A. Unite6 States 
B. Canada 
c. Austrc:..lia 
QUESTIONS OF POLICY 
A. Reasons for According Riq11ts to 
1<es'f .s t 
B. Reas ons Aqainst -----... ~---
CONCLUSIO N 
1 3 
1 5 
1 7 
1 8 
26 
26 
31 
37 
38 
39 
46 
49 
- iii -
Table of Cases 
Bad Elk v United States 
177 US529, 44 L.Ed 874, 20 S. Lt. 729 (1900) 
Bluegum v Police 
(1980) Unreported, Nelson Registry, M.1805. 
Blundell v Attorney General 
0968] N.Z.L~R. 341. 
~~ v Leachins ky 
~ 94 ?J . A. C. 5 7 3. 
Columbus v Holmes 
1 5 2 N.8. 2 d. 3 01 ( 1 9 5 8 ) 
g_i ty of S.!.· Le:_~is V :-f!.~ 
502 SW2d 432 (1973) 
Commonwealth v G~ott_y 
87 AM. Dec. 669 (1 865) 
Donnell.Y, v Jackman 
0 9 7 ETI 1 Al 1 E • R. 9 8 7 • 
Kenlin v Gardiner 
Q967] 2 A.B. 510. 
Koechlin v Waugh 
(1957) 118 C.C.C.24. 
Ludl O\V V ~ 
(1971) Crim. L.R. 238. 
Mi~.~E_ v t!.£Lin~ 
(1911) V.L.R. 347. 
26 
1 - 1 7, 23 , 2 5 , 
28,34, 3 5, 37. 1 41 
45, 48 - 51 
6, 40 
39 
29 
6 
1 , 7, 8 
31 
22, 2?, 3i' , /. : 
- iv -
People v Briggs 
25 App. Div. 2d 50, 266 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1966) 
People v Burns 
198 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 839, 18 Cal. Rptr 921 
( 1 9 61 ) 
People v Cueras 
16 Cal. App. 3d 245 (1971) 
People v Curtis 
70 Cal. 2d. 347, 450 P2d 33, (1969). 
PeOJ?l.!;, v Krum 
374Mich , 356, 132NW2d.69, (1965). 
Peopl~ v Muniz 
4 Cal. App. 562, (1970). 
PeoE.1-E:. v ~ 
1 8 5 NY.S2 d 9 0 7 ( 1 9 5 9 ) • 
f_eople v Pitcher 
9 App. Div. 2d. 1016, 194NYS.2d.337, (1959). 
!'~.op_le v Tins ton 
6 Misc. 2d 485, 163 NYS. 2d. 554, (1957). 
Police v Anderson 
b97~ N.Z.L.R. 233. 
Pounder v Police - -
Q97TI N,Z.L.R. 1080 . 
R. v Fennell 
[]_97~ 1 Q.B. 428. 
R. v Corrier 
(1972) 7 c,c.c. (2d) 461. 
Paqe --~-
a . 
~-. 30 
56" 
5.6 
56 
56 
29 
7 
6 
9, 10, 13-15, 
2 0 s 2 4 , 38 , L1 9 
57 
R. V Cottam -
t97q} 1 C.CC.117. 
E· v Duffy 
~96i} 1 Q.B. 63. 
E• v ~stings 
(1974) 90 CCQ 150. 
E• V Hugget 
(1966) kel. (J) 59 , 1 Hale 465 , 84E.R. 1 082 . 
_g. V Kelly 
0 97q) 4 c.c.c. 1 91 • 
R. v Lascelles 
(1970) 2 C.GC, (2d) 134. 
R. V Mitchell -
( 1 9 7 3 ) 1 3 C 9.C. ( 2 d ) 2 8 2 • 
R. v Morrison 
( 1 889) 6 'i-1.:N. ( NSW ) 32 . 
R. v Osmer 
(1 804) 5 East 304. 
R. V Rua 
G 91 6] G. L. R. 658. 
R. v Saunders 
( 1 9 7 7 ) 3 4 C.C.C, ( 2 d ) 2 4 3 • 
_g. v Slinp 
(1970 ) 1 cc.c, ( 2d ) 275. 
_g. v -~~ning 
D 97oJ 3 c.c.c. 1 45 . 
57 
11, 1 5 , 16. 
31 
54 
57 
-
57 
57 
58 
1, 1 6 , 1 8 , 
20, ~, t.S' 
1, 7, 8, 
1 2, 1 7, I: 9 
33 - 35 
34 , 35 
- vi -
!· v Tommy Ryan 
(1890) 11 L.R. (NSW) 171, 6W.N.162. 
R. v Tooley 
(1710) 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 E.R. 349. 
E· v Turnbridge 
B 97~ 4 WW.R 77, 3 c.c.c. 303. 
R. v Waterfield 
~ 9 64) 1 Q. B • 1 64 • 
Schultz and Schultz v The Queen 
~ 9 7 4] I W. 1·1. R. 2 69. 
State v §_oeri~ 
193 kan. 307, 392 ~ 2d. 930 (1964). 
State v Koonce 
89 NJ Super 169, 214 A.2d 42S (1965). 
State v Miller 
253 Minn. 112, 91 NW2d, 138 (195 8 ). 
State v Miller 
462 P. 2d. 421 ( 1 9 69) • 
State v Robinson 
6 Ariz. App. 424, 433 P.2d. 75 (1967). 
United States v Heliczer 
373 F, 2d. 241 (1967). 
United States v Viqil 
431 F, 2d . 1037 (1970). 
5E 
J9 , 5t: 
J2 
-35 - 37 
56 
56 
56 
22 
29 
INTERVENTION IN DEFIANCE OF UNLA\TF'UL 
ARREST. THE POLICE V BLUEGUM 
[I] fa man without authority attempt to arrest 
another illegally, it is a breach of the peace, 
and any other person may lawfully intervene to 
prevent it, doing no more than is necessary for 
that purpose. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Last year the New Zealand High Cou:ct held that a thircl 
party is not justified in intervening 1i1 . an unlawPu l 
arrest of another person. In The Police v B1uequm2 
the learned judge, Hardie Boys J. 9 discussed the rig hts 
of an individual to resist his own unlawful arrest. The 
court found that there was clear authority in the Common 
Law of England and New Zealand to legally justify any 
reasonable assault he may commit while resisting. 3 The 
court refused, however, to recognise that this right may 
extend to a third party, stating that to accord such a 
right would be to "open the way to wholesale violence 11 • 4 
The defendant was accordingly convicted of assault. 
As early as 18045 the bystanders right to intervene was 
firmly established at English Conunon Law. It is sub-
mitted that t~is right, to resist the unlawful arrest or 
another person, remains part of New Zealand law, and that 
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the Bluegum decision represents an unfortunate departure 
from this. Further, it is argued, that not to recognise 
the third party right on the grounds that it would be to 
encourage violence is to miscoristrue the rationale of the 
right. 
It is intended to provide a study of the Bluequm case 
that involves a discussion of the Common Law of New 
Zealand, and of other jurisdictions, and a consideration 
of policy factors in favour of recognising or rejectin q 
any third party right. 
II. THE BLUEGUM CASE 
A. The Facts 
The defendant, Bluegum, and his friend Williams were 
convicted in the District Court of both assaulting a 
constable in the execution of his duty, and of ob-
structing a constable in the execution of his duty, 
under Sections 76 and 77 of the Police Offences Act 
1 927. 
Constables Borrows and Robinson were on uniformed 
night patrol. While investigating a complaint of 
assault, they stopped a vehicle corresoonding with 
the description given by the compl~inant of the 
vehicle his assailants were in, The defendant and 
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Williams got out and met the constables alongside 
the vehicle when approached. 
Constable Borrows asked them where they had been and 
where they were going. The defendant, in response, 
asked why they had been stopped and the reason for 
the questions. Told by Constable Borrows of the 
alleged assault, Williams denied any knowledge. He 
then asked if he was under arrest, and Constable 
Borrows said that neither of them was, but that he 
would like them to wait where they were until the 
complai~ant could come and identify them. Williams 
made it clear he was not prepared to stay and moved 
to get back into the vehicle. 
To prevent him leaving both constables stepped between 
him and the car. Williams pushed them aside with 
his arm. According to Constable Robinson, Constable 
Borrows said, "you aren't going anywhere yet 0 • 
Constable Borrows then stepped between Williams and 
the car once or twice more and each time was pushed 
aside by Williams, quite forcibly, so that the 
Constable was set back a bout four to five feet. 
Constable Robins on also seemed to have tried to block 
the way and was also pushed aside but with less force. 
Con.stable Borrows purported to arrest Williams plac-
ing his arm on his shoulder. Williams pushed him 
away and, as Constable Borrows attempted to tip 
Williams over onto the ground, the defendant inter-
- 4 -
vened. Grabbing the constable from behind he told 
him to leave his mate alone. Constable Robinson 
subdued Williams on the ground, Constable Borrows 
doing the same with the defendant. Further police 
arrived, the defendant and Williams were handcuffed 
and removed to the police station. 
Williams' assaults allegedly consisted of pushing 
both constables aside so that he could get to the 
car and perhaps of pushing Constable Borrows away as 
he sought to arrest him. The defendant's offences 
both seemed to stem from the one struggle with 
Constable Borrows~ 
On appeal to the High Court, Hardie Boys J. set aside 
both convictions entered against Williams and also 
the conviction entered against Bluegum for obstruct-
ing Constable Borrows in the execution of his du.ty. 
But the conviction for assaulting Constable Borrows 
in the execution of his duty was, however, amended by 
substituting for this offence one of common assault. 
B. The Judqement for Williams 
It is necessary to first consider the judgement for 
Willi~ns since Bluegum's offence stems out of this 
confrontation and his rights will to some extent 
depend upon those Williams possesses. 
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The convictions against Williams were set aside 
because the court did not regard either constable 
as acting in the execution of his duty when they 
attempted to detain Williams against his wishes. It 
1s an essential element of the offences of obstructing 
or assaulting a constable in the execution of his 
duty that the constable in fact be acting in such 
a manner when the alleged obstruction or assault 
takes place. 
The court applied the approach taken in The Queen v 
Waterfie1d6 in order to ascertain the nature of the 
police actim'l. In this case the English Court of 
Criminal Appeal held that it was relevant to con-
sider whether7 
( a) such conduct falls within the general 
scope of any duty imposed by statute 
or recognised at Common Law, and 
(b) whether such conduct albeit within the 
general scope of such a duty, in-
volved an unjustifiable use of powers 
associated with the duty. 
In Bluegum, the appeal court found that the con-
stables were actil'lg pursuant to their duty to in-
vestigate an alleged crime in stopping the vehicle 
and checking its occupants, but that they went 
further than that by endeavouring to detain the 
vehicle and its occupants. 
It is a fundamental principle of New Zealand law 
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that no man can be detained by the police unless he 
has heen arrested. 8
 Accordingly, the actions of 
the constables constituted an unjustifiable use of 
powers associated with their duty. In the opinion 
of Hardie Boys J., "they were in no different position 
from anyone else who places himself in front of a 
0 
citizen to prevent him going where he wishes to go."
7 
Deciding in this way the court rejected an alternative 
approach taken by Talbot J. in Donnelly v Jackman
10 
where it was held that
11 
it is not every trivial interference with 
a citizen's liberty that amounts to a 
course of conduct sufficient to take the 
officer out of the course of his duty. 
This interpretation was adopted by the New Zealw1a 
. a . 12 Supreme Court in Poun er v Police. But the 
Bluegum court applied the Waterfield approach and 
held that by attempting to detain Williarns short of 
arrest the constables were not acting lawfully. 
Williams was justified in attempting to get to his 
vehicle. The subsequent arrest on the grounds that 
this ~onstituted an obstruction was unlawful because 
the constables had precipitated the confrontation by 
unlawfully interfering with the rights of the citizen. 
In these circumstances, the court held, Consta.ble 
Borrows could not claim to have reasonable cause to 
believe Williams had conunitted any offence. ADply-
- 7 -
ing Police v Anderson,
13 reasonable cause is to be 
objectively determined by the court and it does not 
matter that the constable may have honestly believed 
he had reasonable grounds to suspect a person of 
committing an offence. 
In Williams' case there was held to be no grounds 
for convicting him of common assault as an alterna-
tive to the offences charged. He was justified in 
reasonably resisting the unlawful interference by 
the constables on the basis of self defence principles. 
Authority was clearly found for this proposition in 
Kenlin v Gardiner14 and Rex v Rua.
15 
In Kenlin two schoolboys were visiting a number of 
premises reminding members of their school rugby 
team of a forthcoming match. They aroused the 
suspicions of two plain clothes police officers. When 
stopped and questioned the boys did not understand 
the warrant card shown to them, nor did they believe 
the men were genuine police officers. The boys tried 
to escape from the officer~ hold by struggling and 
hitting the police officers. 
On appeal against their convictions for assaulting a 
police constable in the execution of his duty the 
English High Court held that the justification of 
self defence was available, since there was a prior 
assault by the police officers. Taking hold of the 
boys amounted to a technical assault because it was 
c. 
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done in order to detain them for questioning rather 
than as an integral step of arrest. The resistance 
offered was of the nature of self defence and was 
therefore justified, there could be no conviction 
for common assault. 
Similarly in the New Zealand case of~ the 
Supreme Court held that where a constable sought to 
arrest a man by executing a warrant on a Sunday, the 
subject has a right to resist such an unlawful arrest. 
This right to resist allowed him to go to great 
lengths even to the extent of inflicting serious 
wounds in doing so. 16 
The defendant in Rua, resisted the unlawful arrest, 
calling upon his friends to assi s t him. His friends 
responded by killing the constable. On these facts 
Rua was held to have been entitled to call on his 
friends to rescue him and to invite them to use 
reasonable force in doing so. 
Williams was entitled, the Bluegum court held, to use 
reasonable force himself to resist the unlawful execu-
tion of police authority. It is submitted that on 
consideration of the Common Law, the approach of the 
High Court on this point was entirely correct. 
The Judgement Agains t Bluegum 
Hardie Boys J. begins by stating that since he has 
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already held Constable Borrows to be acting outside 
his duty in purporting to arrest Williams, the 
intervention by Bluegum could constitute neither an 
obstruction nor an assault of a constable in the 
execution of his duty. The judge is clear, however, 
that even although Williams was entitled to resist 
his own unlawful arrest, Bluegum was not entitled to 
intervene to assist him. "[w] hat Bluegum did was 
nevertheless an assault. Was it justifiable? ••• I 
think not 1117 
' 
The learned judge says. 
In support of this view His Honour, Hardie Boys J., 
considers the English Court of Appeal decision The 
18 Queen v Fennell. A father assaulted a policeman 
in order to rescue his son who he believed had been 
wrongfully arrested. The arrest was in fact 1a,.vful 9 
and the court ruled that in these circumstances there 
could be no defence 9 based on a mistake of fact, to 
a charge of assaulting a constable in the execution 
of his duty. 
Thel©Wer Fennell court had assumed that had the arrest 
in fact been unlawful, the father would have been 
justified in using reasonable force to secure his 
son's release. The acceptance of this proposition 
by the Court of Appea119 in Fenneg, was acknowledged 
by Hardie Boys J., but the learned judge was correct 
in pointing out that the court was clear that it was 
not expressly deciding the validity of this proposition 
- 10 -
since it had not been argued by counsel. This part 
of the Fennell judgement, which is directly relevant 
to Bluegum's situation, is easily distinguishable as 
mere dicta, the Court of Appeal seeming anxious to 
confine its judgement to the particular facts of 
that case and not to present any general . statement 
of the law. 
The Bluegum court quotes from the Fennell judgement 
the statement: "the law jealously scrutinises 
all claims to justify the use of force and will not 
readily recognise new ones. 1120 This, Hardie Boys 
J., emphasises, was a warning from the Fennell court 
"to ensure the restriction rather than the extension 
of opportunity for violence." 21 The learned judge 
continues that it would, t herefore, be consistent 
with this view to hold that there can be r.o extension 
of rights to justify third party interference in the 
unlawful arrest of another. 
His Honourt Hardie Boys J., goes on to distinguish 
between two kinds of situation where a person is 
justified in using force in the defence of another. 
First, where the plea of self defence was available 
to anyone coming to the aid of an attacked person who 
was within the 'principle civil and natural relations', 
such as master and servant, parent and child, husband 
and wife. Second, is the 'general liberty', even as 
between strangers to prevent a felony. 
It was upon this latter· principle that the Court of 
- 11 -
Criminal Appeal in The Queen v Duffy22 based its 
decision. The facts of this case were that a sister 
attempted a rescue of a girl who was attacked. The 
court allowed a plea of justification where the sole 
purpose of the intervention was to restore the peace 
by rescuing the person being attacked. This justifica-
t . d . d f . f · 23 ion erive rom circumstances o necessity. 
Hardie Boys J. notes that Section 51 of the Crimes 
Act 1961 deals with the first self defence principle 
where a justification is accorded to reasonable 
actions of a third party who intervenes in order to 
rescue a person under his protection or where a 
special relationship exists between the parties. 
Whether the second principle, adopted in Duf f__y , that 
intervention can be justified to restore the peace 
survives in New Zealand law is not clear, but His 
Honour Hardie Boys J. considers it unnecessary to 
decide since, even if it does he says, it is of 
limited application. It "may not be extended to a 
situation like the present where a policeman, with-
out undue force, was attempting to effect an arrest 
. . . "f' d 24 which it now transpires was not Justi ie ." 
In support for his conclusion that there can be no 
third party right to intervene, Hardie Boys J., con-
siders that to recognise such a right would be to 
encourage violence . It would unduly hamper police 
- 12 -
and expose them needlessly to the increased danger 
of attack from friends and relatives in the hope that 
the arrest was unlawful. 
The learned judge acknowledges that his finding that 
a third party has no right to intervene in the un-
lawful arrest of another person may appear to run 
counter to certain observations made by Chapman J. 
in Rua. 25 The implication that "had the friends 
come to the rescue, they would not have committed 
any offence either, provided they acted within reason-
able bounds," in Rua Hardie Boys J. distinguishes. 
In~, he says, the court did not expressly decide 
that. 
On His Honour Hardie Boys'Je part, "there is a great 
deal of difference between what one may do oneseJ.f 
to resist an unlawful arrest, and what others may do 
in coming to one's rescue. 1126 
Even although counsel for the defendant argued that 
any conviction was a result of the unlawful activity 
of the police and that the defendant ought to be 
completely acquitted, Hardie Boys J. held that there 
was no need for Bluegum to interfere at all. He says 
"the law must not appear to give licence to assault 
the police whenever any dispute arises as to the 
exercise of their powers of arrest. 1127 Accordingly, 
in the learned judge's view 9 full justice was done 
by convicting Bluegum of common assault. 
- 13 -
III. CRITICISM OF THE CONSIDERATION OF COMMON LAW AUTHORITIES 
A. Cases Cited in the Bluegum Judaement 
His Honour Hardie Boys J. presents an extremely hrief 
judgement regarding Bluegum 's situation. In his 
learned opinion there is certainly no justification 
for Bluegum's intervention. Support for this he 
f . d . th d . . 28 1n s 1n e Fennell ec1s1on. 
1. Fennell 
In this case the court was clear that to allow 
the defendant a justification based on a mistaken 
belief that the arrest of his son was unlawful 
would be an um1rarranted extension of the la"'· It 
is doubtful whether this is itself a correct 
statement of the law. 29 It should be a aePence 
for the defendant to show that he honestly he-
lieved the arrest was unlawful. Not to accord 
this mens rea defence where the arrest is in Pact 
lawful is a failure to apply ordinary principles 
f h 
. . 30 o t e criminal law. 
An alternative approach is proposed by Glan ville 
Williams, 31 whereby the Fennell court could have 
construed the mistake made by the defendant as a 
mistake of law. This traditionally does not 
amount to a legal justification since no-one is 
- 14 -
supposed to take advantage from not knowing the 
law. If the defendant, in Fennell, was mistaken 
about the nature of the arrest because he was not 
familiar with the law of arrest then that would 
never be a defence. 
The only way Fennell could have justified his 
actions by a mistake of fact construction wouln 
be to show that he believed "either that the 
officer did not suspect his son or that there were 
no facts that could give the officer reasonable 
grounds for suspicion ••• The evidence in this 
case," Williams says, 32 "fell far short of 
establishing such a remarkable frame of mind on 
the part of Fennell. The appea l could have been 
dismissed on that ground." 
Glanville Williams describes the Fennell decision 
· f · d. · · · 3 '3 as an exceptional example o " .JU 1c1al act1 vism", · 
where, to escape from precedents, the Court of 
Appeal improvised a solution by drawing several 
distinctions for which there were no previous 
authorities. 
The principle proposed in Fennell, that the law 
will not extend the opportunity for violence, was 
said in the context of refusing to accord the 
honest mistake of fact defence to a third partv 
intervention. This is an essential point in re-
- 15 -
lation to the interpretation of the Fennell 
decision taken by Hardie Boys J. in Bluequm. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Fennell 
court was indeed issuing a note of warning ahout 
encouraging violence, but this must not be usea 
as authority to contract any rights accorded at 
law. The law ought to first, undertake an 
examination of its bounds before cons idering that 
to recognise certain rights would neces sarily 
constitute an extension. In Hardie Boys' J. 
learned opinion it would clearly be an extension 
of the law to recognise any third party right, 
but this is an assumptiort:~,hich, it is submitteil 9 
he fails to provide adequate support. 
2. Duffy 
The Duffy principle that a stranger may come to 
the aid of another person in order to prevent a 
felony, or to restore the peace, is rejected out-
right by Hardie Boys J. This principle, he be-
lieves, is simply not applicable where a policeman 
is attempting to effect an unlawful arrest. 34 
While His Honour decides that the constables were 
not acting in the course of their duty when they 
attempted to detain Williams and Bluegum, he does 
not consider that their act ions could have con-
stituted a breach of the peace. The learned judge 
states that the Duffy principle can not apply 
where the constables have used no undue force 
in effecting their unlawful purpose. Nor can it 
apply, he says, where the unlawful nature of the 
arrest has only transpired at the time of the 
court's decision. 
In Bluegu!!!, the court prefers not to view the 
confrontation as one in which the constables are 
seen as the aggressors. Rather, the actions of 
the constables are construed as merely technically 
defective and it is the resistance provided by 
Williams and Bluegum which is viewed as the 
violent event. 
There is authority in The King v Osmer 35 that 
an unlawful arrest alone amounts to a breach of 
the peace which any other person is entitled to 
intervene in order to prevent. The court in 
Bluegum might have enquired into what was the 
defendant's perception of the facts. If Bluegum 
was aware that what Constable Borrovrs was doing 
in attempting to detain them and then arrest 
Williams, was unlawful, then it might have appeared 
to him to be a situation where Williams was de-
fending himself against unlawful actions. In 
Bluegum's eyes there may well have been a breach 
of the peace, since this arises where there is 
an actual assault, or where public alarm and 
excitement is caused by a person's unlawful act. 
- 17 -
3. Rua -
With regard to the legal position of Williams 
this judgement,~ v ~ 36 was considered by 
Hardie Boys J. as persuasive authority that an 
individual may resist his own unlawful arrest, 
but His Honour was not prepared to find any 
authority in this decision that a third party may 
come to the rescue of such a person. Yet it is 
implicit that since Rua was entitled to call 
upon his friends to come to his assistance, they 
were indeed entitled to do so. The learned judge 
Hardie Boys J. dismisses the assumption made by 
Chapman J. as mere dicta. 37 
It is respectfully submitted that Chapman J. did 
not discuss the rights of third parties expressly, 
because calling upon others to rescue the arrested 
person was seen as an essential part of the 
right to resist the unlawful arrest of oneself. 
Upon an analysis of the Common Law authorities, 
not referred to by Hardie Boys J. in 3lueg~~. 
this proposition was so firmly established, both 
by case law and the learned opinions of text 
writers, that the position regarding third parties 
was clear. A right to intervene in order to 
rescue another person from unlawful arrest was 
seen by Chapman J. as existing at Common Law. 
B. Cases and Authorities Not Referred to in Bluequm 
The clearest historical expression of the third 
party right to intervene in the unlawful arrest of 
another person is found in The Kinq v Osmer. 38 On 
an indictment for assaulting a constable in the due 
execution of his office, false imprisonment and 
rescue, it appeared that the defendant, while 
rescuing another person, assaulted the constable 
endeavouring to effect the arrest. The constable 
was in fact acting unlawfully since the warrant he 
acted upon was one which he could merely serve per-
sonally but not use to arrest. 
Lord Ellenborough C.J. he1a39 
such indictment bad; it not appearing that 
[the constablaj was an officer of the court: 
and that there could not he judgement after 
a general verdict on such a count as for 
common assault and false imprisonment; be·-
cause the jury must be taken to have found 
that the assault and imprisonment was for 
the cause therein stated, which cause 
appears to have been that the officer was 
attempting to make an illegal arrest of 
another, which being a breach of the peace, 
the defendant might for ought appeared, 
have lawfully interfered to prevent it. 
The defendant in Osmer was acquitted of assaulting 
- 19 -
a constable in the execution of his duty, but he was 
not held liable for the lesser, included offence, of 
common assault. The court held that an unlawful 
arrest was a breach of the peace in which a third 
party could lawfully intervene to prevent, provided 
no more than reasonable force was used. 
Traditionally, the right to resist unlawful arrest 
was part of the more general right to resist any un-
lawful process. This amounted to a reverse applica-
tion of the strict ancient policy of according the 
highest protection to officers of the law who were 
acting within their powers. Unless the officer en-
deavouring to effect the arrest was acting in an 
exclusively legal manner the citizen was justified 
if he used violent means to resist the attack. 
In Hawkin t s Pleas of the Cro1Jm, the opinion of the 
. h t40 law is ta 
since in the event it appears that the person 
slain were trespassers, covering their violence 
with a show of justice, he who kills them is 
indulged by the law, which in these cases 
judg~s by the event, which those who engage 
in such unlawful actions must abide at their 
peril. 
The same view is taken by Chitty in A Practical 
Treatise on the Criminal Law, (181 6), 41 
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if the warrant be, in itself, defective, if 
it not be enforced by a proper officer, or 
if it be executed out of the jurisdiction, 
without being backed by the proper magis-
trate, or the wrong person be taken under 
it, the party may legally resist the attempt 
to apprehend him and even third persons may 
lawfully interfere to oppose it, doing no 
more than is necessary for that purpose. 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephens took the view that "an 
unlawful imprisonment may amount to such a breach 
of the peace as to entitle the bystander to prevent 
it by the use of force sufficient for that pv.rpose. 1142 
Modern support for the exi s tence of the third party 
right to intervene in the unlawful arrest of another 
person is found in several texts. The ~_ng!_i,~~ and 
Empire Digest43 cites Osmer44 as authority that 
this right exi s ts, provided no more than reasonable 
force is used to rescue t he person unlawfully arrested 
and to prevent that breach of the peacec 
Also taken by L.H. Leigh, in his textbook Police 
Powers In Enqland and '.>la le.2,, is the opinion that "a 
person may use reasonable force to rescue another 
from unlawful arrest. 1145 This rule is subject to 
the qualifications provided by Fenne1146 that47 
if the arrest is lawful, and if tr1e only harm 
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which the arrested person was in peril of was 
detention, the rescuer, if he assaults the 
constable will be liable for assaulting a 
constable in the execution of his duty. It 
is otherwise if the person arrested appears 
to be in peril of life and limb so that an 
immediate decision is required. A person who 
uses excessive force in resisting an unlawful 
arrest will be guilty of common assault . 
The interpretation of the law provided by this writer 
is that there is a third party right to intervene 
and that an offence will only be committed should 
he use more than reasonable force. 
. . . k l . 48 Glanville Williams ta est~ view that in England 
the normal right of self defence exists, even where 
the only object of the defendant is to avoid being 
arrested or detained. Further, he says, 1ton prin--
ciple the:t'e is a right to rescue if the arrest is 
in fact unlawful." 
Another learned writer states the Common Law principle 
in terms such that "if any physical force used by 
the defendant is in response to an unlawful act by 
the policeman then the defendant is guilty of an 
assault only if the force used is unreasonable." 49 
This opinion does not seem to distinguish between 
those who resist their own unlawful arrest and, those 
who intervene to assist them. It is a general state-
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ment of law that applies to all situations where 
the defendant responds to unlawful police activity. 
Implicit in many other authoritive opinions is that 
there is always a distinction between what is done 
by a person in response to the lawful actions of a 
police officer and what is done in response to un-
law.f'ul actions. In Halsbury's Laws of England it 
is stated that "any person who assaults another with 
intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension 
or detainer of himself or of any other person commits 
an offence ••• 1150 The position of third parties iY1-
tervening to resist the unlawful arrest of another 
person is, unfortunately, not expressly considered 
in this respected text. 
Authority that the current position at English Common 
Law is that a justification will be recognised for 
the reasonable actions of third parties intervening 
is found in Ludlmv v Burgess . 51 In this case a 
constable in plain clothes was kicked in the shin 
while boarding a bus. As the accused started to 
walk away the constable put his hand on the accused's 
shoulder, not with the intention of arresting the 
defendantf but to detain him for further conversation 
and inquiries. The accused struggled and kicked the 
constable. Two other companions of the accused joined 
in the assault upon the constable. On appeal to the 
English High Court, Lord Parker C.J. set aside the 
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convictions against all the youths on the grounds 
that the detention by the constable short of arrest 
was an unlawful act and constituted a serious inter-
ference with a citizen's liberty. 52 In these 
circumstances they were held to be entitled to re-
sist. 
It does not seem that the judges in this case drew 
any distinction between the resistance provided by 
the first youth, the subject of the unlawful deten-
tion, and the intervention by his friends in order 
to assist him. The defendantts companions, who came 
to Ludlow's assistance, at all times acted as third 
parties, but they were completely acquitted. There 
was no suggestion that they could be alternatively 
liable for common assault in the same manner that 
the defendant in Bluegurn was held to be. 
It is respectfully suggested that these two cases 
have materially similar fact situations and that it 
is unfortunate that the Ludlow decision was not con-
sidered by His Honour Hardie Boys J. The Ludlow 
case provides a substantial basis for considering 
that there exists at English Common Law a third 
party right to intervene in order to rescue another 
person from unlawful arrest. 
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Had Bluegum come before the court just one year 
later, Hardie Boys J. would have been able to 
consider the effect of the recent Crimes 
Amendment Act 1980. Section 2 of this Act con-
solidates the three previous self defence pro-
visions in the Crimes Act 1961 and presents a 
new section 48: 
Everyone is justified in using in the 
defence of himself or another, such 
force as, in the circumstances as he 
believes them to be, it is reasonable 
to use. 
This provision would presumably operate to justify 
any assault Bluegum committed while assisting 
Williams defend himself. It extends to a third 
party the right to act in the self-defence of 
any other, not limited to those who enjoy a 
special relationship. 
Further, the new self-defence provision provides 
for a mistake of fact defence. Should the arrest 
in fact be .lawful, as in the Fennell case, hut 
the defendant has acted under a belief that the 
arrest was unlawful and therefore the arrestee is 
acting in self-defence by resisting, a justifica-
tion wilJ nevertheless be accorded. 
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If the same construction is placed upon the nature 
of the resistance provided by the arrestee as in 
Bluegum, that is that s/he is acting in self-defence 
then a third party will clearly be justified in 
intervening in future cases. 
It may be possible, however, for the courts to 
adopt the approach outlined earlier, (in Part II B), 
that detaining a citizen for conversation is a 
"trivial interference" which is not sufficient to 
render any subsequent arrest unlawful, to which t he 
arrestee would no+ k entitled to resist in self-de fence. 
The new self-defence provision does seem to present 
consistent results with the cases and opinions dis-
cussed here, and only emphasises the apparently 
unsubstantiated conclusion that Hardie Boys J. 
reached in Bluegum. 
The learned judge, could not of course make any 
reference to this recent legislation, but it is 
suggested that there was certainly an alternative 
approach provided by the Common Law to reach the same 
conclusion with regard to Bluegum's liability. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE LAW 
A. United States 
The English Common Law right to resist an unlawful 
arrest became the established rule in the United 
States during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. 53 
In Bad Elk v United States~4 for example, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the defendant, 
whose murder conviction was reversed, had the right 
to use such force as was necessary to resist an 
attempted illegal arrest. 
The traditional American position with regard to the 
intervention of bystanders is that a third party 
stands in the shoes of the person arrested and can 
resist if the latter might have done so. This rule 
was adopted directly from the English Common Law. 
In Commonwealth v crottl:55 an officer attempted to 
exercise a warrant for the defendant's arrest that 
was void and defective on its face. The Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts held that the constable had 
no right to arrest the person on whom he attempted 
to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a 
trespasser. The defendant had a right to resist by 
force, using no more than was necessary to resist 
the unlawful acts of the officer. Any third person 
was held to be lawfully entitled to intervene to p:re-
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vent an arrest under a void warrant, doing no more 
than is necessary for that purpose. 
The court cited The Kinq v Osmer 56 and Chitty's 
Criminal Law57 - as authorities for the right of 
third parties to intervene in the unlawful arrest 
of another person. 
More recently, however, rights to resist unlawful 
arrest have been greatly criticised, and have become 
"part of the passionate political debate over 'law 
and order'." 58 Several states have legislated 
against according any such rights both against inter-
vention from a third party and against resistance 
provided by the subject of the unlawful arrest him-
self. Thege states 59 have followed the recommen-
dations made by Section 5 of the Uniform Arrest Act 68 
and S.304 (2) (a) (i) of the American Model Penal 
Code 61 and have effectively abolished the right to 
resist arrest whenever the actor knows the arrest 
is being made by a peace officer, even although the 
arrest is unlawful. 
In addition to legislating against rights to resist 
unlawful arrestp several State and Federal judges 
have also condemned the right. 62 But, in modern 
American deci s ions on the question of resisting un-
lawful arrest, courts from a variety of jurisdictions 
have applied or recognised the traditional Common 
Law rule, and held that a person may resist an un-
lawful arrest with the use of reasonable force. 63 
Other courts in a few jurisdictions have modified 
their position. Adopting the rule that a private 
citizen may not use force to resist a peaceful 
arrest by one he knows, or has good reason to be-
lieve, is an authorised peace officer performing his 
duties, regardless of whether the arrest is illegal 
· l · · 64 in t1e particular circvJnstances. Accordingly 
no right is recognised to intervene to resist un-
lawful arrest in these jurisdictions in the Bluequm 
situation since there is no doubt that the defendant's 
in Blueaum were aware that the arrest was being 
effected by a constable. 
The law in the United States is divided between 
those jurisdictions which recognise a right to re-
sist unlawful arrest and those which recognise no 
rights to resist arrest, regardless of its illegality. 
There is a further division among those states which 
do recognise a right to resist unlawful arrest. 
This is between those states that extend this right 
to third parties, upon intervention, and those that 
limit the application of a justification to the 
party that is himself the subject of the unlawful 
arrest. 
Examples of where the right to resist have been ex-
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tended to third parties are such cases as People v 
. 65 d 66 Br1gas, an People v Papp • 
In Briggs, the New York Supreme Court held that "one 
is privileged to resist illegal arrest, even by 
police officers, provided that the force or violence 
utilised is not more than is reasonably sufficient 
to prevent such arrest". 67 In this case a father 
was acquitted of a charge of assault in second degree 
violation of Penal Law Section 242, subd.5, while 
he was in the course of resisting the unlawful arrest 
of his son. 
But in 1973, the Missouri Court of Appeals expressly 
considered the rights of third parties to intervene 
in order to resist the unlawful arrest of another 
person. h . f . 68 In Te City o St. Louis v Treece a 
father intervened in the arrest of his wife and child. 
The court held that, even if the police officer's 
arrest of the defendant's wife and child had been 
illegal, the defendant had no right to interfere 
except where the officer is using unreasonable and 
unnecessary force to effect the arrest. 
This position had earlier been adopted by the United 
States Court of Appeals in United Sta tes v Vigi1 69 
and in United Sta tes v Heliczer. 70 The court in 
these cases held that a bystander has no right to 
intervene if there is reason for him to be aware 
that the arrest is being made by a peace officer. 71 
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The consistent thread through the American judicial 
decisions and the opinions of commentators is, how-
ever, their agreement that the traditional American 
position of third parties who intervene as standing 
in the shoes of the arrested person, is a right de-
rived from the Common Law. 
d . . 72 Reynol s J. in Briggs states, "appealants in turn 
are supported ••• by the long history of decisions 
countenancing resistance to an unlawful arrest," and 
here he is referring to both defendants, including· 
Brigg•s father who came to his assistance by inter-
vening in hi.s unlawful arrest. 
It is the conflicting opinions about whether the 
right to resist is appropriate to modern conditions 
which is the basis for the judicial disagreement in 
the United States. It is not a result of a disagree-
ment that these rights ever existed at Common Law. 
And even although. to say that there is a trend to-
ward limiting the right of resistance to illegal 
arrest73 
is true, in the sense that the common-law 
rule has recently been modified in some 
jurisdictions; it is not true that the 
common-law rule has been abandoned more 
often than upheld in the modern cases. 
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B. Canada 
Canadian criminal law accords the right to resist 
unlawful al"rest to those who are themselves the 
subject of the unlawful arrest. In this respect, 
the English Common Law position is clearly adopted. 
If a constable is not making a lawful arrest then 
the arrestee is entitled to resist such an arrest. 74 
In~ v Hastin~ the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
held that "if the police officer making an arrest 
had no right to make the arrest without a warrant 
the citizen has a right to resist the arrest. He is 
entitled to retain his freedom. 1175 
This approach was adopted in Koechlin v Waugh76 
where Laidlaw J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal 
said the defendant had been unlawfully arrested 
since he was not informed of the reason for his 
arrest and in these "particular circumstances he was 
entitled to resist the efforts of the police officers 
and they have failed in this case to justify their 
actions. 1177 In this case the unlawfully arrested 
person was held to be entitled to damages as com-
pensation for the unlawful actions of the police 
officer. 
· · 78 h f d In Regina v Stenning t e Supreme Court o Cana a 
applied the law as it was interpreted in the English 
case The -~e_<:_12 v Waterfield. 79 
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Thus, while it is no doubt right to say in 
general terms that police constables have a 
duty to prevent crime and a duty, when crime 
is committed, to bring the offender to 
justice, it is also clear from the decided 
cases that when the executing of these 
general duties involves interference with 
the person or property of a private person, 
the powers of constables are not unlimited. 
h · d · · b · a 80 T ese cases were applie in Regina v Turn ri tge 
where the court held the defendant legally justified 
in resisting the unlawful interference by the 
constable with his person. 
The right to resist unlawful arrest extends only to 
such of the defendant's actions as are reasonable 
in the circumstances. Any excessive force used. will 
incur liability for the included offence of common 
assaul t 81 where the charge is brrught under Section 
246 (2) (a) or (b) of the Canadian Criminal Code 1953, 
assaulting a peace officer engaged in the executing 
of his duty. 
Canadian law with regard to the rights of the person 
unlawfully arrested is consistent with the approaches 
taken by both the British and Hew Zealand courts. 
The Canadian courts in recent times have, however, 
tended to view the third party situation as one in-
volving different considerations. 
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82 In Regina v Saunders, the Appeal Division of the 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that it was obstruct-
ing a peace officer in the execution of his duty, 
to intervene in the unlawful arrest of another person. 
The accused attempted to intervene in the arrest of 
his friend Hooper, who was never informed of the 
reason for his arrest. The unlawful nature of the 
arrest, the court held, justified any reasonable 
resistance offered by Hooper without making him 
liable to a charge of assaulting or obstructing the 
officer, but this privilege of resistance could not 
be extended to the accused. 
Cooper J.A., on behalf of Mackeigan C.J.N.s. and 
CGffin J.A., said that 83 
the invitation oE counsel for the [?.ccuseci] 
to extend the privilege of resistance en-
joyed by Hooper under the circumstances here 
present, to the [accuse<U is one which I re-
fuse to accept. No authority was cited to us 
in support of such an extension and I cannot 
conceive of the existence of such authority. 
Any rights of resistance possessed by Hooper 
was his and his al one. • • The [?.ccused' ;} 
action must in my opinion be considered 
separate and apart from the question of a 
possible invalid arrest of Hooper. 
The accused was subsequently convicted of obstructing 
\~CTORl '1 ,, • r 1 
• ' . \' ., ' ,, I ,,t' u· . 
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a peace officer in the execution of his duty. Had 
he assaulted the constable, while intervening in 
the unlawful arrest of Hooper, the conviction would 
possibly have been one of assaulting the constable 
in the execution orhis duty since this judgement 
maintains that as far as the accused was concerned, 
the constable, while endeavouring to unlawfully arrest 
Hooper, was nevertheless held to be acting in the 
execution of his duty. Had the Blue9;;:;m case been 
before this court, the judges may have indeed held 
Bluegum liable for not merely common assault, but 
for assaulting a constable in the execution of his 
duty. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of 
this court in Saunders can be criticised. In Reqina --
v SlipP84 , decided several years earlier, t\110 
constables entered the defendant's property in order 
to check the driver's licence of his son who they 
suspected of driving while intoxicated. The New 
Brunswick Supreme Court held that since the constables 
had no right to request the son's driving licence, 
his subsequent arrest for failure to produce it was 
unlawful and the defendant who intervened, obstruct-
ing the constable endeavouring to effect this arrest, 
was held to be not liable of obstructing a constable 
in the execution of his duty. 85 
The opinion of the covrt in Slipy is that a constable 
unlawfully arresting another person is not acting in 
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the execution of his duty, But the view of the court 
in Saunders was that this was not the case at law, 
and that a constable executing the unlawful arrest 
of another person is acting in the execution of his 
duty as regards the intervening third party. 
The charge against the defendant in Slipp was ob-
structing a constable in the execution of his duty, 
and since there is no included offence as there is 
in assaulting a constable in the execution of his 
duty, the defendant had to be completely acquitted. 
This case, unfortunately, does not provide any inter-
pretation of the Bluecrum situation, where the de-
fendant, although acquitted of assaulting a constable 
in the execution of his duty, was nonetheles s con-
victed of coimnon assault. 
Further discussion of the Canadian position with 
regar.d to intervention by third parties i s found in 
86 the case of Schult z and Schultz v !!;e .~ • The 
facts of this case were that two brothers were stopped 
in a car by a police constable who formed the opinion 
that Sylvester Schultz, the driver, was impaired by 
alcohol and demanded a sample of breath. He told 
Sylvester to get into the police car to be taken to 
the detac:r.ment office, and he told Rodney Schult ?., 
whom he also believed to be unfit to clt'i ve, to accompany 
hi1n. During the journey both brothers became a busive 
and threatening; the const able stopped the car, got 
out and tried to put handcuffs on Rodney in order 
to restrain him; Rodney resisted and a scuffle en-
sued during which Sylvester came to his brother's 
assistance and the constable was kicked and otherwise 
assaulted. At no time did he say that he was placing 
Rodney under arrest. Both were charged with a.ssaul t-
ing a peace officer engaged in the lawful execution 
of his duties. 
Maher D.C.J. in the Saskatchewan Dis trict Court held 
that87 
it cannot be said that the constable was at 
the time engaged in the execution of his 
duties as a peace officer; or that Rodney 
Schultz was required to submit to such re-
straint on his freedom. 
The appeal was_ allowed, the conviction against Rodney 
quashed, but with regard to Sylvester, the judge held 
that the situation was not the same. . 88 He continue s , 
[t] his appealant was being t1~ansported to 
Humboldt for the purpose of supplying a 
sample of his breath for analysis. No 
attempt was made to restrain his freedom 
or to place him under arrest, but he took 
it upon himself to go to the assistance of 
his brother and assaulted Constable MacDona ld 
by striking him at least once. While the 
constable may not have been engaged in the 
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execution of his duties at the time of th~ 
assault and the facts will not support a 
charge under Section 246 (2) (a) the 
appeallant, Sylvester Schultz is certainly 
guilty of the included offence of common 
assault. 
The opinion of this judge is that there is a right 
to resist the unlawful detention of oneself but no 
right of third parties to intervene in order to 
provide assistance in this situation. While the 
third party will not, at least in this case, be 
liable for assaulting a constable in the execution 
of his duty, he will nevertheless be liable for 
common assault. 
How far this judgement represents the general Canadian 
position with regard to third party intervention :i.s 
unclear. It would seem that the tendency is to 
interpret the law in a similar manner as that applied 
by Hardie Boys J. in the Bluequm case and accord-
ingly not recognise a justification for the actions 
of a third party. 
c. Australia 
Australia similarly adopted the English Common Law 
position "that an illegal arrest being an assault, 
the person arrested may resist with a corresponding 
amount of force to that used in the assault." 89 In 
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adopting this approach, it has been said90 
that the Australian states and territories 
have endorsed the notion that unlawful in-
terference with an individual's liberty is 
so reprehensible that it should b€ able to 
be challenged then and there by self help 
rather than just later by litigation. 
The position regarding intervention by a third party 
in the unlawful arrest of another person does not 
seem to have been specifically considered by the 
Australian judiciary, and it is difficult to pre-
dict the approach the Australian courts would take 
if a case of this type came before them in the light 
of recent criticisms made about the right to resist 
91 unlawful arrest. 
V. QUESTIONS OF POLICY 
The propriety of recognising rights to resist unlawful 
arrest in third parties, in particular, is a.n area where 
there has recently been controversy in several jurisclic-
. h . h . h ' d 92 d tions. In 1971 t e Englis Hig Court in Lu 10,v an 
the Court of Appeal in Fenne11 93 considered those two 
situations where a third party offered resistance on be-
half of another, yet the approaches were not entirely 
consistent. 
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The United States, also, is divided about the interpreta-
tion of the law most fit for its legal system, and Canada 
seems unwilling to accord any rights to a party other than 
the person subject to the unlawful arrest. 
Adopting in principle the strong words of Lord Simonds in 
the House of Lords in 1947: 94 "L.b ]1ind, unquestioninq 
obedience is the law of tyrants and of slaves: it does 
not yet flourish on English soil," New Zealand courts 
appear willing to recogni se a justification for the 
arrestee's reasonable defiance of unlawful arr~st only. 95 
In order to rationalize these decisions it is intended to 
discuss the various policy considerations behind recog-
nising or rejecting certa in rights to resist unlawful 
process. 
A. Reasons for Accordi nq Riqhts to Resist 
The traditional view that a citizen is justified in 
resisting an unlawful arrest is primarily based upon 
the opinion that an unlawful arrest is a serious 
interference with a person's liberty. In 1710 the 
court in The Queen v Tooley said: "it would be hard 
that the liberty of the subject should depend on the 
will of the const ab le. 1196 Some 230 years later, 
Lord Simonds in tlJe House of Lords said that 97 
it is the right of every citizen to be free 
from arrest unless there is in some other 
citizen, whether a constable or not, the 
right to arrest him. And I would say 
next that it is the corollary of the right 
of every citizen to be thus free from 
arrest that he should be entitled to re-
sist arrest unless that arrest is lawful. 
The right to resist unlawful action is a firm ex-
pression of the civil libertarian values which form 
the basis of the English constitution. There are, 
however, competing needs, for example, to have an 
efficient and effective police force. The balance 
must be maintained by a strict definition. of the 
bounds of police powers. 
The English and New Zealand view, is that, any power s 
the police exercise need to be firmly based in eit her 
legislation or the Common Law. 
An illegal arrest is an assault and battery98 on 
the person arrested, and also amounts to a false 
imprisonment. Authority is found in Blundell v 
Attorney General, where McCarthy J. in the Court of 
Appeal said: 99 
· one fundamental rule of the common law which 
we have inherited as part of the British 
system of justice is that any restraint upon 
the liberty of a citizen against his will 
not warranted hy law is a false imprisonment. 
"To deny such person the right to resist in this 
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circumstance would be analogous," one American 
commentator has said, 100 "to stripping away the 
somewhat similar common law privilege of self-
defence.11 
In addition, the right to resist unlawful arrest was 
historically imperative to the ultimate wellbeing of 
the victim of the unlawful process. Conditions of 
detention during the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies were so bad that often, a person in jail ran 
a real risk of dying of disease before trial since 
bail was almost impossible to obtain. 101 
Such extreme conditions may not be common in the 
jails of more modern timesr and at worst the victim 
of an unlawful arrest can be very distressed, but 
will not usually be under any greater ~isks to life 
or limb. The Common Law courts, however , have still 
taken the view that a citizen ought not to be pena-
lised for reasonably resisting an unlawful inter-
ference with his liberty. Resistance to unlawful 
authority is seen as a quite justifiable response. 
If no right to resist unlawful arrest is accorded, 
then it would be contrary to justice that the victim 
be left without an alternative remedy. In New 
Zealand a civil action may be taken against the 
police by the victim of the unlaw~il arrest for 
f . . 10? alse imprisonment. - Where, however, there are 
allegations that the unlawful arrest amounted to an 
assault or battery upon the arrested person, then it 
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is doubtful whether any civil claim for damages can 
be undertaken. 
The Accident Compensation legislation effectively 
bars any proceedings for compensation arising, either 
directly or indirectly out of an injury by accident. 
The bounds of this prohibition are unclear, but it 
seems that even punitive, or exemplary damages taken 
in order to punish the official for his unlawful 
actions, may be barred where the action complained of 
amounted to an assault or battery, no matter how 
. h 103 slig t. 
The abolition of the Common Law right to compensation 
in this context may well leave the wronged person in 
some circumstances, ,,,i thout an effective legal 
remedy, and any civil remedy, should Oi'le exist, will 
be a costly and lengthy business, often not worth 
the trouble. 
Further, the decision to resist is the 'work of the 
moment' rather than a decision in which the actor 
would engage in a contemplation of the alternatives 
available or even the consequences of undertaking the 
particular course of action chosen. 
There may be some situations where it would only be 
applying principles of equity to accord a justifica-
tion for a persons reasonable response to an unlawful 
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interference. Assume, for example, the following 
circumstances: 
A loses her dog while exercising him late one evening. 
B, a plain clothes officer has been watching her as 
she quietly enters private gardens . He reason-
ably suspects that A is committing some offence. 
He approaches A, takes hold of her and without 
saying a word attempts to force her to accompany 
him. 
The purported arrest is clearly unlawful; the officer 
has completely failed to identify himself and inform 
her of the reasons for the arrest. It is quite 
likely that in these circumstances A would respond 
by endeavouring to escape by assaulting the police 
officer. If this was the case, then most obser,~rs 
would feel it quite unjust to convict A of common 
assault. A justification for her resistanc e would 
be felt to be in order~ This would be accorded by 
an Eng·lish or New Zealand court. 
A justification would also be accorded, it seems, if 
the arrest was unlawful because of a more technical 
defect. Suppose, in the example above, that Bis 
uniformed, he identifies himself, explains his 
suspicions to A, and then arrests in an apparently 
legal manner. If the constable did not have the 
necessarily objective reasonable cause to suspect, 
then the subsequent arrest is unlawful. If A 
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attempts to escape, however, by assaulting the 
officer, it is more difficult to justify her re-
sponse, and it does not accordingly, seem unfair 
to convict for common assault. 
In this respect, the Blue[1:_m court does not appear 
to distinguish between plainly unlawful arrests and 
those that are technically unlawful when recognising 
Williams' right to resist • 
. It may be a more fair solution to look at the overall 
nature of the confrontation including the arrestee~ 
state of mind, and in thi s regard a type of com-
promise would be made by the courts depending- upon 
the relevant circums tance s . 104 
There may be circumstances involving the intervention 
by a third party which would equally merit justifica-
tion. Suppose tha t in the first hypothetical: 
A loses her dog while exercising him with c, her 
friend. While A is searching the gardens, C is 
looking in the park across the road. 
C comes upon the police officer as he is seizing 
A and forcing her along with him without explana-
tion. 
A is greatly di s tressed and is calling for help 
while resisting herself. The police officer is 
countering with greater force. 
What are C's rights? 
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According to the Bluegum decision if C intervenes in 
order to assist A exercise her right of resistance 
he will be guilty of a common assault. C may merely 
place a hand on the police officer intending to pull 
him away in order to question him about the circum-
stances of the seizure, yet if a scuffle ensues he 
will be liable for assault. 
What Chas done, in most opinions, is to respond to 
the unlawful arrest in an understandable manner. He 
has intervened with the sole intention of resisting 
what appears to him to be an outrageous affront to 
both himself and his companion. 
If C uses excessive force in resisting the unlawful 
actions of the police officer, then a conviction for 
common assault, or a more serious offence is quite 
in order. But if he is dravm into the situation by 
his own moral outrage, intending not to assault the 
police officer, but to protect A and obtain some 
explanation from the police officer, then it would 
be an injustice to convict him of assault. If he 
in fact, kills the police officer in the knowledge 
that the arrest was plainly unlawful, then it may be 
that a provocation defence would be available to him . 105 
The third party right to resist would always be 
limited to fact situations where the third party 
intervenes for the sole purpose of rescuing the 
party arrested and not to 1 join in the fight' or for 
B. 
revenge against the police officer for some reason. 
To ascertain circumstances of this type would not 
be too onerous a task to impose on the courts since 
they are engaged in a similar exercise when apply-
ing the principles of provocation and self-defence. 
Also to justify reasonable resistance by a third 
t ld t b . 106 par y wou no e to 11 encourage v1olence 11 but 
rather it would be a recognition of an expected re-
sponse. Principles of self-defence are not with-
held on the grounds that they operate to "encourage 
violence". A self defence justification does not 
exist to incite people to violence but to allow the 
law to respond to the mitigating elements within 
any confrontation. To recognize a justification 
for the reasonable resistance of a third party 
would not, it is respectfully submitted, be incon-
sistent with this reasoning. 
Reasons Against 
' -
To some extent, there are equally compelling argu-
ments for abolishing or limiting the Common Law 
justification for resisting unlawful arrest. 
It has been urged that resisting is no longer suited 
to modern conditions. Today most jurisdictions 
have an objective professional police force, trained 
to apprehend and to overcome resistance. Policemen 
are easily identifiable so that wronged parties can 
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lay complaints and bring civil actions to aggrieve 
their feelings. 
Resisting 1s an application of the concept of self 
help which is not an appropriate remedy in the un-
lawful arrest situation. Self help is only proper 
where no other remedy is available and immediate 
action is called for, but not, where the greatest 
danger a person is in is of being detained for a 
short while by the police, and where there will 
ultimately be alternative legal remedies. 
It is argued that if citizens resist arrest their 
actions can only represent an escalation of force 
since a police officer 1s likely to respond by a 
greater use of force. In most ca£es rea sonable re-
sistance will not e ven secure a person's liberty, 
the police will ultima tely subdue the arrestee ·,vho 
will, himself, perhaps have suffered some injury. 
Resisting does not prevent the arrest. One 
Australian commentator says that107 
11 [a] fter all, he who resists an unlawful 
arrest almost always ends up, in the short 
run, under arrest and thus, like the person 
who submits, must litigate its legality 
later. All that his right to resist really 
achieves is an additional violent incident 
in an already violent society. 11 
Others have said only the guilty resist anyway 
- 48 -
because they have motive to, while innocent citizens 
have nothing to fear from arrest. 108 
Furtherf it is unrealistic to suppose that the 
citizen can successfully distinguish between an 
arrest that is illegal and one that is legal or 
wrong only for some technical rule. The law about 
arrest is so complex that it is un~rise for anyone 
to offer resistance in the face of police action. 
These arguments clearly apply equally to a bystander 
who takes it upon himself to enter the dispute. 
His interference will only add one more violent 
component to the confrontation. 
Foster J., more than a century ag o, was of the 
. . 109 opinion: 
wise and good men know that it is t he duty 
of private subjects to leave the innocent 
man to his lot, how hard soever it may be, 
without attempting a rescue; for otherwise 
all government would be unhinged. Yet, 
what proportion doth the case of a false 
imprisonment, for a short time, and for 
which the injured party may have an ade-
quate remedy, bear to that I have now put? 
Arguments to this effect were plainly in mind when 
His Honour, Hardie Boys J., refused to accord any 
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justification for the assaults committed by Bluegum. 
Williams was entitled to act in self-defence, yet 
Bluegum was not justified in assisting him because 
that would 11 open the way to wholesale violence . 11110 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Indications of judicial disapprovement of third parties 
rights in an unlawful arrest situation issued from the 
English Court of Appeal in Fennell when the court refused 
to apply a mistake of fact defence in the circumstances 
of a lawful arrest. This apparent contraction of legal 
principle was, however, taken to its utmost in the New 
Zealand High Court decision The Police ·v Bluecrum. 
By denying any justification for the alleged assaults 
committed by Dluegum in order to rescue his companion 
from illegal arrest, it is respectfully submitted, His 
Honour Hardie Boys J., departed from a long tradition of 
Common Law principles. 
Clear authority can be found in .Osmer, l_fila and Ludlow, 
that where an arrest or detention is unlawful, another 
person is justified in seeking to rescue the arrestee. 
It might be that, in some opinions, the Bluequm decision 
reflected the most appropriate position with regard to 
the specific issue of third party intervention, but it 
is hoped that this position was the result of a compre-
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hensive debate and not, as might in some eyes be sus-
pected, a product of judicial expediency. Full justice, 
it is suggested, was indeed done to Williams, but 
whether the same can necessarily be said with regard 
to Bluegum is doubted. 
Th ' . . h f d " · , 111 e implications t e recent sel - erence legislation 
will have on the position of a bystander, in Bluegum's 
situation, is yet to be discovered. It would appear 
that if the same construction is placed on the activity 
of the resisting arrestee, that is, s/he is justified 
by self-defence principles in resisting an unlawful 
arrest, then the reasonable actions of a third party 
who intervenes in order to assist will be justified by 
Section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961. 
It is respectfully submitted that this would be the most 
equitable approach, and would accord with traditiona.l 
Common Law. If the third party was not aware of the 
unlawful nature of the arrest then no defence ought to 
be recognised since the intervening party could not pro-
pose to have been acting, on the facts as he believed 
them to be, in the self-defence of another. 
A future case of similar facts to Bluequm may as a result 
of this legislation provide a complete justification for 
a reasonable assault allegedly committed while in the 
course of resisting unlawful arrest. This will be with-
out regard as to whether the actor was resisting as an 
arrestee or as a third party. 
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The Bluegum decision appears to be made in terms of 
very distinct principles. The learned judge is quite 
adamant that no justification can be accorded for 
Bluegum's actions even although there exists one for 
Williams' resistance. 
It is hoped that a more comprehensive examination of 
social policy as well as the Common Law of England, New 
Zealand and of other jurisdictions has been provided in 
order to expand the discussion within this narrow issue. 
Even although Bluegum suffered a small penalty in the 
form of a $50 fine, it is rather the principles of real 
justice that are at risk when he is penalised for 
challenging the unlawful exercise of police power. It 
is hoped that the citizens of New Zealand are not yet 
blind nor are they slaves to unquestioningly obey 
authority. 112 
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